International reports on environmental policy promote ‘education for sustainable development’ as an instrument for realising environmental awareness, values and attitudes consistent with the liberal concept of ‘sustainable development’. In this paper the ethical and political-philosophical assumptions of (education for) sustainable development will be criticised. First, it will be argued that (Rawlsian) liberal ethics cannot include obligations towards future generations. Second, the commentary focuses on the economic perspective underlying this liberal framework, its anthropocentric bias and the hierarchical distinction between public and (...) private spheres. Third, to offer a more adequate framework for environmental education, some fruitful ideas within neo-republicanism will be examined. (shrink)

After the moral framework of sustainable development, the focus on climate change appears to take a lead in the practice and theory of environmental education. Inherent in this perspective is an apocalyptic message: if we do not rapidly change our use of energy resources, we will severely harm the life conditions of our children and grandchildren. In this article we argue that environmental educators should liberate us from this highly instrumental dictate by taking their cue from our daily care for (...) our environment as revealed in child?s play in nature. Inherent in the interaction of the Homo ludens with nature is a spiral time experience. This time condition elicits a particular responsibility: rather than calculating which means are necessary to prevent future disasters, we should respond with care to the concentric circles of an open and indefinite future. Therefore, environmental education should not aim to prevent future disasters, but foster anticipating care for nature. (shrink)

Throughout more than two millennia philosophers adhered massively to ideal standards of scientific rationality going back ultimately to Aristotle’s Analytica posteriora. These standards got progressively shaped by and adapted to new scientific needs and tendencies. Nevertheless, a core of conditions capturing the fundamentals of what a proper science should look like remained remarkably constant all along. Call this cluster of conditions the Classical Model of Science. In this paper we will do two things. First of all, we will propose a (...) general and systematized account of the Classical Model of Science. Secondly, we will offer an analysis of the philosophical significance of this model at different historical junctures by giving an overview of the connections it has had with a number of important topics. The latter include the analytic-synthetic distinction, the axiomatic method, the hierarchical order of sciences and the status of logic as a science. Our claim is that particularly fruitful insights are gained by seeing themes such as these against the background of the Classical Model of Science. In an appendix we deal with the historiographical background of this model by considering the systematizations of Aristotle’s theory of science offered by Heinrich Scholz, and in his footsteps by Evert W. Beth. (shrink)

Leading philosophers from both sides of the Atlantic present essays on Wilfrid Sellars's Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind, one of the crowning achievements of 20th-century analytic philosophy. They discuss empiricism, perception, epistemology, realism, and normativity, showing how vibrant Sellarsian philosophy remains in the 21st century.

this essay argues that John McDowell's argument that sensations are a useless 'fifth wheel' in Wilfrid Sellars' philosophy of experience fails.

Though Wilfrid Sellars portrayed himself as a latter-day Kantian, I argue here that he was at least as much a Hegelian. Several themes Sellars shares with Hegel are investigated: the sociality and normativity of the intentional, categorial change, the rejection of the given, and especially their denial of an unknowable thing-in-itself. They are also united by an emphasis on the unity of things—the belief that things do ‘‘hang together.’’ Hegel’s unity is idealist; Sellars’ is physicalist; the differences are substantial, but (...) so are the resonances. (shrink)

If we appeal to God when our technology (including medicine) fails, we assume a “ God of the gaps.” It is religiously preferable to appreciate technological competence. Our successes challenge, however, religious convictions. Modifying words and images is not enough, as technology affects theology more deeply. This is illustrated by the history of chemistry. Chemistry has been perceived as wanting to transform and purify reality rather than to understand the created order. Thus, unlike biology and physics, chemistry did not provide (...) a fertile basis for natural theologies. It is argued that an active, transformative role of humans is appropriate in biblically inspired religions and called for in the light of imperfections and evil in the world. When the expression “playing God” is used dismissively, as if we trespass upon God–given territory, a theologically problematical association of God and the given order is assumed. A different view of the human calling can be articulated by drawing upon the Christian heritage and by developing an antinatural religious naturalism. (shrink)

This article explores managers’ ethical reasoning for behaviors in price negotiations using evidence from 15 in-depth interviews conducted with sales and purchasing representatives in the chemical industry in Germany. Applying transaction cost economics, we find that negotiators in commoditized market-like exchanges either refer to deontological norms such as not to lie, or they neglect a role for ethics, arguing that distributive negotiation is per se opportunistic. In contrast, exchanges of products with higher asset specificity lead to stronger informational integration which (...) is supported with teleological justifications. Some negotiators use teleological justification to build business on trust rather than on economic safeguards as their firm norms would require. For negotiators, our results suggest considering institutional context and adjusting ethical reasoning to the negotiation situation. Firms need to recognize and find ways to address the potential conflicts of their internal norms with their frontline managers’ attempts to act in the firms’ best economic and ethical interests. (shrink)

Dieses Buch hat sich die Aufgabe gestellt, den Beitrag der allgemeinen Wissenschaftstheorie der Naturwissenschaften zur Forschungsmethodik des naturwissenschaftlich arbeitenden Zweiges der Psychologie zu erbringen. Im Anschluss an die Ausarbeitung der Programmatik einer Protopsychologie – der Wissenschaftstheorie der Psychologie – werden traditionelle wissenschaftstheoretische Probleme erörtert, welche für die naturwissenschaftliche Psychologie – aber auch für andere Naturwissenschaften – von Relevanz sind. Die Themenpalette reicht hierbei von der Frage nach den wesentlichen Merkmalen von Naturgesetzen bis hin zur Planung, Durchführung und Evaluation von Experimenten. (...) Spezifische Probleme der Psychologie – etwa die Frage nach der methodischen Rolle der Instruktion im psychologischen Experiment – werden dabei jeweils besonders berücksichtigt. (shrink)

The term naturalism arouses strong emotions; religious naturalism even more. In this essay, naturalism is explored in a variety of contexts, in contrast to supernaturalism (in metaphysics), normativism (in ethics and epistemology), and rationalism (in the philosophy of mind). It is argued that religious naturalism becomes a “thick” naturalism, a way of life rather than just a philosophical position. We can discern a subculture with a historical identity, a variety of dialects, stories that evoke attitudes and feelings, as well as (...) more systematic theological elaborations. In this context, religious naturalists are called to thicken further the ways of life that embody their religious and naturalist sensitivities. In order to speak of a naturalist theology in this context, one has to define theology in a way that avoids assumptions regarding the supernatural; this can be achieved by presenting theologies as particular combinations of cosmologies (informed by the sciences) and axiologies (values). (shrink)

Even though Plamondon's kinematic model fits the data well, we do not share the view that it explains movements other than ballistic ones. The model does not account for closed-loop control, which is the more common type of movement in everyday life, nor does it account for recent data indicating interference with ongoing processing.

Accounts and analyses of the formation of scholarly and scientific communities in the early modern period by means of memory and collective identity.

Since the early 20th century, bioethics in South Africa has moved through several stages, responding to the same forces and developments as elsewhere, for example in the United Kingdom and United States. In addition, some unique developments in South Africa, for example the death of Steve Biko, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, and a peaceful transition to democracy with increased focus on human rights have given bioethics in South Africa its own dimension. Bioethics in South Africa reflects the general concerns of the (...) field elsewhere, but it also stands at the intersection of the concerns of both developed and developing worlds. Thus, issues such as resource allocation, HIV/AIDS, and medical research take on an urgency and character that reflect South Africa's particular historical, geographical, and social conditions. (shrink)

Whereas the relationship between truth and propositional content has already been intensively investigated, there are only very few studies devoted to the task of illuminating the relationship between truth and illocutionary acts. This book fills that gap. This innovative collection addresses such themes as: the relation between the concept of truth and the success conditions of assertions and kindred speech acts the linguistic devices of expressing the truth of a proposition the relation between predication and truth.

In 1870 Jordan proved that the composition factors of two composition series of a group are the same. Almost 20 years later Hölder (1889) was able to extend this result by showing that the factor groups, which are quotient groups corresponding to the composition factors, are isomorphic. This result, nowadays called the Jordan-Hölder Theorem, is one of the fundamental theorems in the theory of groups. The fact that Jordan, who was working in the framework of substitution groups, was able to (...) prove only a part of this theorem is often used to emphasize the importance and even the necessity of the abstract conception of groups, which was employed by Hölder. However, as a little-known paper from 1873 reveals, Jordan had all the necessary ingredients to prove the Jordan-Hölder Theorem at his disposal (namely, composition series, quotient groups, and isomorphisms), and he also noted a connection between composition factors and corresponding quotient groups. Thus, I argue that the answer to the question posed in the title is “Yes.” It was not the lack of the abstract notion of groups which prevented Jordan from proving the Jordan-Hölder Theorem, but the fact that he did not ask the right research question that would have led him to this result. In addition, I suggest some reasons why this has been overlooked in the historiography of algebra, and I argue that, by hiding computational and cognitive complexities, abstraction has important pragmatic advantages. (shrink)

Abstract.For moral guidance we human beings may be tempted to turn toward the past (scripture, tradition), toward present science, or toward future consequences. Each of these approaches has strengths and limitations. To address those limitations, we need to consider how these various perspectives can be brought together—and “religion and science” is an area in which this may happen. That makes the question of where to look for guidance potentially a central one for religion and science, setting the agenda differently from (...) apologetic questions with respect to religion or to science. However, “religion and science” does not solve the issues, leading to a single normative perspective; the way that current knowledge is integrated with past wisdom is highly dependent upon ideals that relate to the future. Thus, rather than resolving the need for guidance, the religion‐and‐science conversation becomes one way of addressing our need for guidance, bringing into the conversation past, present, and future. (shrink)

This book brings together international experts on the application of Niklas Luhmann’s theory of society as autopoietic communication. Luhmann’s sociological systems theory is counter-intuitive and in its detached coolness difficult for many to understand and accept. Naturally they ask: is it really worth the trouble to learn? This book demonstrates what this combination of systems theory, Batesonian information theory, von Foerster’s second-order cybernetics, Maturana and Varela’s autopoiesis and Husserl’s phenomenology can offer. The book is produced in cooperation with the Sociocybernetic (...) Group and Copenhagen Business School. (shrink)

Cognitive Grammar postulates two modes of cognitive processing for the structuring of complex scenes, summary scanning and sequential scanning. Generally speaking, the theory is committed to basing grammatical concepts upon more general cognitive principles. In the case of summary and sequential scanning, independent evidence is lacking, but Langacker argues that the distinction should nonetheless be accepted as it buys us considerable theory-internal explanatory power. For example, dynamic prepositions, to-infinitives and participles (e.g., into, to enter, entered ) are distinguished from finite (...) and bare verbs in terms of summary vs. sequential scanning. In this paper, we try to show that various theory-internal and theory-external arguments do not seem to support the two scanning modes. In particular, we offer a detailed examination of causatives (e.g., get, make ) and argue that their complementation patterns are difficult to reconcile with differences in scanning. We conclude that the status of, and need for, summary and sequential scanning in (Cognitive) grammar is doubtful, especially if grammar is approached from the viewpoint of the language learner/user. It follows also that the parcelling of some form-function mappings may prove less clear-cut than previously assumed. (shrink)

Evidence for motion extrapolation at motion offset is scarce. In contrast, there is abundant evidence that subjects mentally extrapolate the future trajectory of weak motion signals at motion offset. Further, pointing movements overshoot at motion offset. We believe that mental and sensorimotor extrapolation is sufficient to solve the problem of perceptual latencies. Both present the advantage of being much more flexible than motion extrapolation.

The paper gives a short introduction to and overview of truth relativism in recent philosophy of language.

Professor Joseph Agassi hat in dieser Zeitschrift meine Analyse von Quines Stellung in der analytischen Tradition kritisiert und dabei insbesondere die Irrelevanz von Neurath betont und Quines Nähe zu Popper herausgestellt. In meiner Antwort geht es mir sowohl um eine Rehabilitation Neuraths als auch um die Unterschiede von Quines Philosophie zu Popper und Wittgenstein.

Goodman and Elgin have recommended a reconception of philosophy. A central part of their recommendation is to replace knowledge by understanding. According to Elgin, some important internalist and externalist theories of knowledge favor a sort of undesirable cognitive minimalism. Against Elgin I try to show how the challenge of cognitive minimalism can be met. Goodman and Elgin claim that defeat and confusion are built into the concept of knowledge. They demand either its revision or its replacement or its supplement. I (...) show that these are three very different options. While agreeing with the view that there may be good reasons for some revisions and supplements, I strongly disagree with Elgin and Goodman's replacement thesis. (shrink)

This article addresses the difficulties that the phases of economic evaluations give rise to in theory and practice. It provides a brief outline of the meaning of economism — as a term and a concept — and then explores the issues that are related to the measurement and monetary valuation of the items to be included in economic evaluations, otherwise known as the valuation problem. The article also deals with the commensurability problem and the intrinsic value problem. Finally, some of (...) alternatives and recommendations that can help avoid the pitfalls of economism are discussed. (shrink)

AT Sophist 255b7-e the Eleatic Stranger gives two arguments, one to show that being and identity are not the same, and one to show that being and otherness are not the same. Scholars have not paid them particularly close attention, but it seems generally agreed that the two arguments are quite different. In this paper I shall offer an interpretation which shows that the two arguments, though superficially quite different, are intrinsically and importantly related. Specifically, in the first argument the (...) Stranger elicits an obvious falsehood from the hypothesis that being and identity are the same. I claim that in order to distinguish being and otherness an exactly parallel argument could have been given instead of the second argument we actually find. However, there are sound dramatic reasons why this was not done, for in this case the falsehood would not be obvious. Instead, the argument we are given takes us deeper and analyzes the source of the falsehood by introducing a distinction between absolute and relative uses of"being.". (shrink)

In his moral psychology, Prof. Frankfurt pays special attention to two strongly related issues which should be given pride of place in every genuine account of human action and behaviour: these issues are the problem of personal autonomy and what I would like to call the problem of self-constitution. The first concerns the question what it means to be a fully human, rational agent, i.e., someone who is accountable for and in one way or another conscious of what he does (...) and desires; the second concerns the question how human beings become selves or persons with a particular identity, i.e., somebody who is not only accountable for and conscious of his or her own deeds, desires and preferences at a given time, but also able to identify with his or her personal life-history, as a through time related structure of deeds, beliefs, volitions, preferences and desires.In the following, I shall first of all formulate a rather free interpretation of the important and penetrating reflections of Prof. Frankfurt on the concept of care, which, as I understand it, accounts for the interdependence of autonomy and self-constitution. I shall then formulate a critical reflection and some related questions, more or less inspired by Charles Taylor’s investigations of the constitution of the self and the problem of rational autonomy. As is well known, Taylor has been partly influenced by Frankfurt’s writings on these issues, but of course — and that’s what my questions will be about — I leave it to Prof. Frankfurt to determine how well Taylor’s suggestive account of the constitution of the authentic self fits the Frankfurtian descriptive metaphysics of human mind and action. (shrink)